The conventional distribution network is undergoing structural changes and becoming an active grid due to the advent of smart grid technologies encompassing distributed energy resources (DERs), aggregated demand response and electric vehicles (EVs). This establishes a need for state estimation (SE)-based tools and real-time monitoring of the distribution grid to correctly apply active controls. Although such new tools may be vulnerable to cyber-attack, the cyber-security of distribution grid has not received enough attention. As smart distribution grid intensively relies on communication infrastructures, we assume in this paper that an attacker can compromise the communication and successfully conduct attacks against crucial functions of distribution management system, making the distribution system prone to instability boundaries for collapses. We formulate attack detection problem in the distribution grid as a statistical learning problem and demonstrate a comprehensive benchmark of statistical learning methods on various IEEE distribution test systems. The proposed learning algorithms are tested using various attack scenarios which include distinct features of modern distribution grid such as integration of DERs and EVs. Furthermore, the interaction between the transmission and distribution systems and its effect on the attack detection problem is investigated. Simulation results show attack detection is more challenging in the distribution grid.
Introduction
Due to the strong dependence of smart grid functions on information and communication technology (ICT), the number of possible cyber-attacks has been increased [1, 2] . These attacks can reduce the reliability of smart grids and cause severe operational failures and substantial financial loss [3] [4] [5] . Therefore, the cyber-security of smart grid has been highlighted and become a significant concern among power researchers. Among identified cyber-attacks, the most critical one is the false data injection (FDI) which make transmission system state estimation (SE) inaccurate [3] . Wrong estimates can lead to wrong supervisory decision makings which can lead to catastrophic consequences such as blackouts [6] . The adversary orchestrates these attacks by altering readings of smart meters to inject arbitrary errors to state estimates without being detected by bad data detection (BDD) methods [7] . Therefore, detection of FDI attacks is essential for ensuring the overall reliability of smart grids. To this end, several mitigations and detection methods have been proposed to protect the system operation and control against FDI attacks. They include protection-based approaches [8, 9] and detection-based approaches [6, 10] . While significant numbers of research works have been conducted on the cybersecurity of the transmission grid, focusing on the cybersecurity of the smart distribution grid is in its early stage. Hence, by identifying this important gap, this issue is set as the focus of this paper. With more and more intelligent sensors and pervasive electronic automation devices deployed into the smart distribution grid, the distribution system is subject to high risks of cyber-attacks like the transmission grid. Conventional distribution networks were passively designed to deliver energy efficiently and reliably from the transmission grid to the end users. However, due to shifting towards the smart grid and with the advent of distributed generations (DGs) and electric vehicles (EVs), distribution grid is undergoing structural changes [11, 12] such as bi-directional power flow (flowing back from customers to the distribution grid), uncertainty and dynamic variation of system load profiles, voltage stability problems, and distribution system operating at stability boundaries are also troubling the distribution grid operation.
To meet the changes in technology, reliable and real-time monitoring of the distribution system is needed as it is critical to verify the security state of the system which makes the role of distribution system SE more significant [13, 14] . SE is well established in the transmission grid but is currently under development for the distribution grid due to lack of communication infrastructure, and the fact that most distribution systems were not monitored in the past [12, 13] . Recently, attempts have been made to develop SE methods to estimate the state of the network, in terms of node voltages or branch currents for distribution grid [15] .
However, the integrity of state estimation is under mounting threat, and they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks specifically false data injection attacks [7] . Deng et al. [16] extend FDI attacks against state estimation in transmission systems to distribution feeders. These attacks can cause severe damages to the distribution systems. An adversary can, for example, launch a cyber-attack to manipulate measurements to disrupt a critical component of the grid such as a circuit breaker to cause a blackout [17] . Therefore, malicious attack detection is the essential step for preventing or minimizing the damages resulting from the FDI in the smart distribution grid. On the other side, attack detection problem in the distribution grid is different from the transmission grid. This is because these networks differ from one another in many ways, such as high resistance to reactance (r/x) ratios, radial network topology, and increasing variable and less predictable load profiles due to complex interactions of DERs and EVs, etc [14, 15] . Fig. 1 shows how these unique characteristics of the distribution grid make the attack detection more challenging in this network. For example, the high r/x ratios and unbalanced loads separated by short distances lead to having different and broader valid measurement ranges. This means a change in the measurement which should be detected as an attack in the transmission grid can be a normal one in the distribution grid.
In this paper, we focus on FDI attack detection problem in Fig.1 : New features of the smart distribution grid the smart distribution system using statistical learning techniques. Although a different number of methods have been proposed for FDI attack detection in the power systems, to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper that utilizes machine learning methods to detect data integrity attacks in the distribution grid with considering its modern characteristics and for the first time proposes a benchmark of those methods. More specifically, this paper provides insight into how to use machine learning algorithms to detect anomalies in the modern distribution network and their capabilities in this field. 4 . Integration of transmission and distribution networks and the influences of different possible events in the transmission grid such as contingencies on attack detection problem in the distribution grid is investigated. The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II formulates the attack detection problem as a statistical classification problem. Statistical learning methods are described in Section III. In Section IV, we present our experimental results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
Problem Formulation
As more measurements become available in future distribution grid, SE will be used for distribution system monitoring as widely as transmission systems. Distribution system state estimation is done to estimate the state of the network, in terms of node voltages or branch currents for distribution grid [15] . For example, references [13, 15] have tried to adopt weighted least squares (WLS) for the distribution systems. For an N -bus distribution system using an AC state estimation, the system model to study the attack detection is defined as:
where z ∈ R m×1 is the measurement vector, x ∈ R n×1 is the vector of the state variables [18] . h(·) : R n×1 → R m×1 is a nonlinear vector function between measurements and distrbution system states. e ∈ R m×1 is the measurement error vector. The estimated system state x are obtained by minimizing the WLS criterion. The estimation process is followed by a BDD method based on 2-Norm of measurement residual to detect the presence of bad measurements r = z − h( x) ≥ τ , where τ is a predefined detection threshold [18] . To mislead the power grid control algorithms, the attacker needs to inject a nonzero attack vector a to the original measurement vector za = z + a without being detected by the BDD. The malicious measurement za could bypass the BDD detector and not lead to a change in the residual value under the condition a = h( x + c) − h( x), where c = [c 1 , · · · , cn] is the maliciously injected error on the system state [19] . After false data injection, distribution system state estimation will get an erroneous system state [16] :
To perform FDI attacks, we make assumption that the attacker can somehow compromise the communication infrastructure of a region and a subset of the sensor readings and will finally be able to introduce arbitrary error into some critical measurements in the distribution grid such as voltage magnitude |V | and line current between bus i and bus j |I ij |. This means it is assumed that vector c could be injected to voltage magnitude of buses [V 1 , · · · , Vn] and branch currents [I 1 , · · · , I nbr ] where nbr is the number of branches. It is noteworthy that bus 1 is a reference bus, so it is fixed as a constant with a unit magnitude which causes the voltage magnitude vector become [V 2 , · · · , Vn]. Therefore, the attack model can be described as:
The attack detection problem is to find the corrupted vector. Given a set of samples S and labels Y (normal versus tampered), machine learning algorithms try to learn the latent relationship between the samples and label to produce a function S −→ Y for classifying the measurements in two groups, secure and attacked. Therefore, the attack detection problem using statistical learning algorithms can be defined as a binary classification problem:
where y i = 0 shows that there is no attack and y i = 1 means the ith measurement is corrupted. It is assumed that for each targeted state, various injection amounts, e.g., 90%, 110%, of the true value are simulated. 
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Supervised Learning Algorithms
To classify the measurements into normal and attack, five learning algorithms including Bayesian Network (BN) [20] , Support Vector Machine (SVM) [21] , K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [22] , C4.5 decision tree [23] and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [24] are employed. We choose BN since it is a powerful inference method and represents the probabilistic graphical models (PGMs). PGMs are widely used in power system area to model the probabilistic dependencies among different measurements [10, 11] . The assumption is that the attack will lead to a different graphical model [10] . SVM is used since it has a good generalization ability and has been shown to be effective in discriminating normal samples and attack ones [25] . KNN is chosen due to its lazy learning efficiency. C4.5 is an extended version of ID3 algorithm [23] and represents decision tree-based algorithms. MLP is a type of neural network which is commonly used in different applications and is able to discriminate non-linearly separable classes.
1) BN Classfication:
A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical model (a directed acyclic graph (DAG)) that represents a joint probability distribution over a set of variables [20] . BN provides a mapping from a sample s i to the posterior probability of belonging to the attack class y i = 1, P (y i = 1|s i ). The posterior probability of the presence of an attack in terms of prior probabilities and the reverse conditional probability can be obtained as follows:
To learn a BN, the structure of the DAG needs to be determined. The search space to build the structure includes all of the possible structures of DAGs based on the input variables. To enumerate all of the possible DAGs, reference [26] proposed a heuristic search algorithm called K2 which searches for the most probable Bayesian network structure. Fig. 2b shows an example of built DAG for 18-bus network when the input variables are line currents. This test system is shown in Fig. 2a . Nodes of this graph are corresponding to line currents. For example, i4-5 means the line current between bus 4 and bus 5. Class Label represents the label of the samples. Test systems are discussed in detail in section IV.
2) SVM: Given a set of N training samples S = {(s 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (s N , y N )}, SVM seeks a hyperplane that separates the attacked and normal measurements [21] . To this end, SVM minimizes the following cost function which tries to maximize the margin (linear separation of data) and minimize the error (penalization of misclassified samples):
where C is the penalty parameter, ξ i is slack variable showing the non-separability of data, w is the weight vector of the SVM network, b is the bias term of the SVM network. SVM can manage the nonlinear relationships between class labels and attributes using the kernel function
, where φ(s) is a nonlinear transformation which maps training sample s i into a higher dimensional space, where SVM recognizes the solution. In this paper, the kernel radial basis function is used to separate the solution sets which are not linearly separable and is defined as:
where γ adjusts the smoothing of the discriminant function.
3) KNN: KNN is a lazy method which does not construct any classification model in advance. It labels a new observation according to the labels of predefined (k-nearest) number of training samples closest in distance to the new point [22] . The distance metric used in this paper is Euclidean distance. Thus, first the set of KNNs of the new observation s i is constructed and then the most frequently observed class label in the set is defined through a simple majority vote. Afterward, the s i is labeled as the most frequent class label.
4) C4.5:
The goal of a decision tree is extracting predictive information in the form of decision rules inferred from the training samples S. Then, these rules are used to predict the value of a target variable of the new sample s i . In this paper, the C4.5 algorithm is used to construct the decision tree. In this approach, at each node of the tree, an attribute is selected to split the samples based on information gain [23] . Assume that Fr(y i , S) is the frequency of samples belonging to class y i . The entropy (E) of S which is is a measure of the amount of uncertainty in dataset is computed as follows [22] :
where k is the number of distinct classes, |S| is the total number of samples in S. After computation of E(S), S is divided into n number of outcomes regarding an attribute say x. Therefore, Ex(S) is the weighted sum of all the individual entropies of subsets of samples (s i ). Then, the final entropy is calculated as follows [22] :
Information gain (IG) is the measure of the difference in entropy from before to after the set S is partitioned on an attribute x and is equal to IG(x) = E(s) − Ex(S). IG(x) shows how much uncertainty in dataset is reduced after partitioning data on attribute x and is calculated for all attributes. The best attribute to split S is the attribute with the greatest IG. This means that attribute becomes the parent node of the tree. The child nodes are created in a similar way until all the entries are classified to a single output class.
5) MLP:
Given a set of N samples and the class label, {(s 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (s N , y N )}, MLP can learn a nonlinear function approximator for classifying the measurements into normal and attacked [24] . MLP is a feed-forward artificial neural network consists of different interconnected layers: an input, an output layer and one or more hidden layers. Except the input nodes, other nodes are neurons which have usually a nonlinear sigmoid activation function.
One widely used activation function which ranges from 0 to 1 is as follows:
where v i is the weighted sum of the inputs of the ith node and y i is the output of the node. For learning, MLP utilizes a technique called backpropagation which is a generalization of the least mean squares algorithm in the linear perceptron (LP). Unlike LP, MLP can manage nonlinearly separable datasets.
Ensemble Learning Methods
To make good predictions, classification methods search a hypothesis space for finding a proper hypothesis. Finding a good hypothesis might be difficult. Ensemble techniques combine a collection of hypotheses to build a (hopefully) better hypothesis [27] . Output of ensemble methods is a single hypothesis which it might not be within the hypothesis space of the models from which it is trained. This means that ensemble techniques can have more flexibility regarding the represented functions. However, that flexibility might lead to overfitting. A supervised learning hypothesis method is said to overfit if it is more accurate in fitting the training data and less accurate in predicting the class label of the test data. In the following, ensemble learning techniques such as Adaptive Boosting and stacking are explained.
1) Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost): AdaBoost could be used to boost the performance of any classification algorithm [28] . Adaboost works by building multiple learning models in a sequence. The first model is built by fitting a classifier on the original dataset in the usual way. Then, the second model is built by fitting another copy of the classifier on the same dataset with focus on samples that were misclassified in the first model. Then, the third copy of the classifier is trained in such a way that focuses on previous model's errors. This means in each iteration, the weights of misclassified records are adjusted such that consequent classifiers focus more on difficult instances which were incorrectly classified. A boosted classifier is in the following form:
where each b t is the base learner which takes the input sample s i and returns its class y i and T shows the number of iterations. For each sample s i , the base learner generates an output hypothesis h(s i ).
At each iteration, a coefficient α t is attributed to the base learner in such a way that the sum of training error of the resulting t-stage M t is minimized:
where B t−1 (s i ) represents the boosted classifier which has been developed up to precedent stage. M (B) is the error function, and
is the base learner which will be added to the final classifier. At each iteration t, a weight w t equal to M (B t−1 (s i )) is assigned to each training sample s i which will be used to inform the training of the base learner. In this paper, each learning algorithm is combined with Adaboost technique with the number of iterations 10 and 100. However, we observed that there is not much difference between them so that results of the 100 one are presented in the paper.
2) Stacking: Stacking uses a meta-learner to combine the predictions of a collection of classifiers [29] . To this end, first different learning algorithms are trained on the original data. Then, predictions of those classifiers are fed into a meta-classifier to combine their output and make a final prediction. Logistic regression is usually used as the combiner.
Performance Evaluation
To validate the statistical learning algorithms, F-measure (FM) and detection rate (DR) are derived from the confusion matrix. F-measure is defined as follows [27] :
where Pr is the precision, Re is the recall and they are computed as follows:
where true positive (TP) is the number of attack samples correctly detected, false positive (FP) is the number of incorrectly detected attacks, true negative (TN) is the number of truly identified normal samples, and false negative (FN) is the number of missed attacks. F-measure value 1 indicates the best performance. DR is the number of attacks detected by the method divided by the total number of attacks in the dataset.
Benchmark Results
In this section, the performance of the machine learning methods are analyzed using different case studies. First, we launch attacks in each system using the formulation mentioned in Section II and train each learning algorithm in Case I. In this case, it is assumed that there is no DERs, EVs and also the effect of the transmission grid is ignored. In the next case studies, we use the trained statistical models to evaluate the robustness of the algorithms in managing unique characteristics of the distribution grid and also integrated power system. It is noteworthy that a grid search [30] method is employed to search the parameters of the learning algorithms.
Data Preparation
To complete simulations, different IEEE systems such as 18-bus, 33-bus, and 123-bus distribution systems are used. In each network, feeder bus is selected as the slack bus. The historical data have been preprocessed by MATPOWER [31] and DIgSILENT [32] . To simulate the power system behavior in a more realistic pattern, two types of time-varying load models are considered: 1) time-varying residential load and 2) time-varying commercial load. The load data is adapted from Open Energy Information (OpenEI) [33] and are combined in the test systems as shown in Fig. 2a and Fig. 3 . Fig. 4 shows a dataset from OpenEI for each utilized network.
To obtain measurements at time t, i.e., |V i (t)| and |I ij (t)|, for simulations, we run a power flow based on the power profile above. Therefore, time-series data are gained by repeatedly running the power flow to generate hourly data over three months. Totally, T = 2160 measurements are obtained as normal samples.
Case Study I -Detecting Attacks in the Networks without any DERs and etc.
In this case, we have assumed that the system works well except days 62 to 66. This means the measurements of 5 days are completely replaced by the attacked ones. Therefore, there are 120 attack samples for each attacking scenarios with incremental/decremental attack cost and overall 240 attack samples for each measurement. To build machine learning models, we tested the learning algorithms on the generated datasets. The models were built using 10-fold cross validation. Fig. 5 summarizes the test results for this case study. The more detailed results are presented in the appendix. We observed that most of the algorithms have good F-measure for all networks. However, for voltage magnitudes, SVM, MLP and stacking technique have the F-measure 1 for all networks. For the branch currents, it is observed that the stacking approach provides better F-measure by decreasing false positive (FP) rate and increasing detection rate. Moreover, for this measurement, we observed that the normal samples which are incorrectly labeled as attacked variables by methods, are increased. This is because the variance of changes in the branch currents is increased and it is difficult for algorithms to draw a boundary line between secure and attack measurements.
Case Study II -Testing the Trained Models to Detect Attacks after Integration of DERs.
Expansion of distribution grid by adopting DERs has attracted much attention due to increased energy demand, economic and environmental benefits [11] . However, integration of DERs could cause significant uncertainty and variability [34] . In this case, we have analyzed the robustness of the built machine learning models in dealing with the integration of DERs into the network through injecting false data after that integration. To this end, it is assumed that the system works normally until day 20. On the 21st day, solar panels are selected as the source of renewable energy to be added to networks with a fixed penetration level (40% of the peak load). The hourly power generation profile is obtained using PVWatts Calculator, an application developed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) [35] . Power generation of a photovoltaic system in PVWatts, is estimated based on physical parameters and weather. The hourly data are computed based on the weather history of Casa Grande, AZ, USA.
We randomly choose a bus as the location of PV. The renewable power generation is modeled as a negative load. Attacks are conducted on days 62 to 66. Fig. 6 summarizes the test results of testing pre-built learning models. The more detailed results are presented in the appendix. As one can see, the trained models cannot predict samples correctly after integration of DERs. This is because adoption of DERs creates unforeseen dynamics leading to data distribution change. Therefore, old observations are different than the new ones. For voltage magnitudes, we observed that the trained algorithms are able to detect most of the attacks even after integration of the DERs. The maximum and minimum voltage limits considered to be ±10% but data distribution change in the voltage magnitudes is not too much. Moreover, considering all networks, SVM is the best method to detect attacks for voltage magnitudes for this case study. In addition, we observed that the least F-measure belongs to the BN which shows a significant drop. This drop is because of a decrease in the detection rate which means its trained model has classified most of the attacks as normal samples.
For branch currents, we observed that the KNN is better than other methods while its F-measure is decreased significantly. The main reason for this reduction is a decrease of the detection rate which means integration of DERs has led to having broader measurements range so that the trained model incorrectly labels the new attacked variables as normal ones. Furthermore, while stacking method has good F-measure in the trained model, it provides the worst result along with the BN. The reason is overfitting of the trained model. Overall, in this case study, it is observed that BN which is based on constructing a DAG is not robust against changes in the network. The KNN is superior to other methods since it does not build any model but memorizes the training dataset and all the work is done at prediction time.
Case Study III -Testing the Trained Models to Detect Attacks in the Networks with EVs.
Adoption of plug-in EVs can lead to a significant draw on the distribution grid. EVs can connect to the grid to supply power during peak load times to increase the reliability of the grid (vehicle to grid) [36] or they can be connected to the grid to be charged (grid to the vehicle).
In this case, for evaluating the robustness of the statistical learning methods in managing adoption of EVs, attacks are orchestrated in the systems after integration of EVs. To this end, we have assumed that EVs are integrated into the networks after integration of DERs from day 31st and attacks are launched on days 62 to 66. In this simulation, EVs are connected to the grid to charge their batteries between 11 PM to 2 AM and are connected to the grid to charge grid between 8 AM to 10 AM. The required energy for EVs is considered to be 10% of the average daily load [36] . Locations of the EVs are selected randomly. Fig. 7 presents the summary of test results for this case.
We observed that SVM has better F-measure over the tested networks in detecting attacks for voltage magnitudes. However, MLP also yields good performance. BN is the worst method which shows that BN is not robust to adoption of EVs and it is because of increase in FN rate.
For branch currents, it is observed that KNN has better F-measure over different networks comparing to other methods. Moreover, it is observed that integration of EVs leads further decrease in the Fmeasure of the methods as the system size increases, i.e., 33-bus and 123-bus. This is while in the small networks like 18-bus and also 8-bus, F-measure is less decreased comparing to the results of case study II. Integration of EVs could lead to natural jumps in the data that inflate the variance in the absence of attacks which mislead the trained models. Therefore, it leads to increase of FN rate specifically in the bigger networks and that is the major reason for reduction in F-measure.
Case Study IV -Testing the Trained Models to Detect Attacks in Integrated Power System.
To date, most of the distribution networks are designed and usually analyzed separately without considering the impact of the transmission network [37] . This is while a real power system is an integration of transmission and distribution networks as shown in the Fig. 8 . For transmission network, the BB acts as a PQ bus so that it is modeled as an equivalent admittance in the admittance matrix. For distribution network, the BB acts as the slack bus. So, it is modeled as an equivalent network.
Fig. 8: Integrated power system
Therefore, one motivation of this case study is analyzing the interaction between the transmission and distribution systems. More specifically, the effects of topology changes in the transmission network are considered in this case study. To this end, it is assumed that the distribution test networks are attached to the IEEE 14-bus test system and the system works normally until day 59. At this time, two line outages (4 -5 and 2-5) occur as shown in Fig. 9 and the system works under those contingencies for 9 days and attacks are orchestrated on days 62 to 66. This means attacks in the distribution grid are launched after contingencies in the transmission network. Fig. 10 represents the summary of test results for this case study.
Fig. 9: IEEE 14-bus test system
We observed that SVM provides better results over different networks. We observed that detecting attacks on voltage magnitudes in 123-bus system is more challenging compared to other cases. For branch currents, it is observed that MLP and KNN have better performance. It is noteworthy that detecting attacks on this variable in this case study, is less challenging comparing to adoption of DERs and EVs. The least F-measure over different networks is for BN network and stacking method. This means the BN is not robust to changes and it is not recommended to be used in the smart distribution grid. Fmeasure of the stacking method shows the trained model in the case study I is overfitted. The major reason for decrease in F-measure for this variable is misclassifying the attacked measurements as normal ones. 
Conclusion
Data integrity attacks can deteriorate the control performance of the distribution grid and cause maximum damages to it and may lead to a serious financial loss. Therefore, in this paper, for the first time, the attack detection problem is formulated as a statistical learning problem with considering the inherent and special characteristics of distribution grid such as dynamic variation of load profiles due to the adoption of DERs and EVs. To conduct attacks, the hypothesis in this paper is that an attacker can compromise the communication infrastructure of the distribution grid and launch attacks on two critical variables: voltage magnitudes and branch currents. Furthermore, we take a comprehensive analysis on identifying the proper detection method for each variable and demonstrate a comprehensive benchmark of supervised and ensemble learning algorithms. We observed that dynamic nature of the distribution grid is difficult to model because the learning algorithm has to mimic different behaviors with heavy time-dependencies. Therefore, the trained machine learning algorithms could not yield the primary performance and misclassify new observations after integration of DERs, EVs, and contingencies in the transmission grid. The comprehensive results can serve as an exclusive reference for future discussions to improve cyber-security of the distribution grid. Tables 1 to 12 represent the detailed results of the machine learning methods over different case studies. As one can see, detecting attacks on branch currents are more challenging than voltage magnitudes. More specifically, we observed a significant reduction in F-measure values of the learning algorithms when the trained models are tested on datasets of the case studies II-IV. This is because the variance of data of branch currents is much more than the voltage magnitudes. Fig. 12a shows how voltage magnitude of a bus changes over three months. Fig. 12b shows variance change of a line current over three months. As it is clear, the range of the line current magnitudes is much more than voltage magnitudes. Such a broader valid range makes an attack obvious on voltage magnitudes to be hard to distinguish on branch currents. Fig. 13a shows the voltage magnitude of a bus before and after integration of DERs. We observe that integration of DERs does not lead too much data distribution change so that the learning algorithms can yield good performance in detecting attacks on voltage magnitudes in case study II. This is true also about other case studies. Fig. 13b shows the effect of integration of DERs in case study II on a line current. As it is clear, this integration shows a significant change in data distribution. Therefore, it is difficult for machine learning methods to manage this change and detect attacks. More specifically, based on the detailed results for case study II in Tables  2, 6 , and 10, the learning algorithms are experiencing a significant reduction in F-measure because of reduction in detection rate. This means integration of DERs has led to label the attacked measurements as normal ones and has increased the false negative rate. Furthermore, we observed more reduction in the 18-bus test system for this measurement compared to other networks. This is because the peak demand in this network is more than the other utilized networks which shows the attack detection becomes more challenging as the system load increases.
Appendices
As one can see in Tables 3, 7 , 11, integration of EVs leads to increase of false negative rate which leads to decrease in F-measure for branch currents. This reduction is more in bigger networks, i.e., 33-bus and 123-bus. For voltage magnitudes, we observed that SVM outperforms other methods. Experimental results show that stacking model is overfitted and cannot provide good results in test case studies. Furthermore, results show that the boosting method does not have a substantial effect on the base learners' F-measure. Tables 4, 8 , and 12 present the results for case study IV. It is clear that attack detection on voltage magnitudes is more challenging for learning methods as the system size increase except SVM. Considering different case studies, SVM can be a good option for detecting attacks on voltage magnitudes. For branch currents, KNN is more robust against uncertainty comparing to other methods.
We observed that graphical models such as BN are not robust against changes and they might not be proper to be used in the distribution grid. We observed that detection rate is not a good performance metric to evaluate the methods. This is because an algorithm has a higher detection rate in some scenarios but it also has a higher false positive rate. For example, in the Table 2 , detection rate of C4.5 for line current is 0.947 and it is the highest detection rate while it has less F-measure. The reason is its high false positive rate 0.673 which means most of the normal samples are classified as attack samples. That is why this algorithm has higher detection rate. Therefore, F-measure metric is more reliable in this context. 
